Making EVERY Vote Count

The following resources are provided for those who would like to delve deeper into the study of voting systems and include not only the extensive analyses performed by election reform authority Charles T. Munger, Jr., but also others with expertise in the field. If you would like to provide any comments on, or contributions to, these resources, please use the Contact Us section of this website.

Analyses

My various papers each have individual abstracts that gives their principal results, and each has an introduction that describes the content of the separate section of the paper. The papers and sections can (mostly) be read independently of each other; think of a section as something like an entry in an encyclopedia, a book which one could if one chose read from cover to cover, but which is designed to let a reader look up and read information about one topic mostly without reading information about another.

To help a potential reader navigate, here the papers are grouped into one of three categories: The California Top-Two Primary; Condorcet Methods Versus Instant Runoff and Election Methods Without Ranked-Choice Ballots. 

For each paper is listed its title, often its abstract or a summary, and then what can be found in it, section by section. Major sections of a paper are indexed by Roman numerals; subsections, by capital letters; and sub-subsections by numbers.

A summary and conclusions covering all three linked papers — California's Top-Two Primary: A Successful Reform, papers I, II, and III — appears in III on p. 13. The four linked papers The right way to read Ranked-Choice ballots: not Instant Runoff, but Ranked Pairs, papers A through D have a single abstract

Approval voting is Condorcet-compatible voting under a constraint: A critique of Approval, and both Range and Star, voting

Approval voting is Condorcet-compatible voting under a constraint: A critique of Approval, and both Range and Star, voting

Summary: Two systems of electing one candidate from many are compared and proved identical: approval voting, and voting with a Condorcet-compatible method and ranked-choice ballots, but ballots on which voters must assign each candidate one of but two distinct ranks.

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